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ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER: THE ROLE OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Roland E. Brandel*and Zane 0. Gresham**

The financial industry in the United States is on the brink of a great revolution, a revolution resulting from fundamental changes in both the types of
financial services available and the delivery mechanisms for those services.
One stimulus is technological-the increasing application of electronic technology to the accomplishment of financial transactions. Generically this application of electronic technology is referred to as "electronic funds transfer"
(EFT). The second force stimulating this revolution is legal-the changes
being wrought in the nature and scope of activities in which financial institutions are permitted to engage. Distinctions among the various types of
financial institutions are becoming blurred by statutory and regulatory modification of the powers of those institutions. Moreover, some nonfinancial institutions now provide many services which traditionally had been available
only through financial institutions.
These interacting forces have created a dynamic situation in which the
rights and responsibilities of users and providers of financial services are in
flux. Serious value judgments must be made with respect to what services
shall be offered, by what institutions, and through what means. This article
addresses the possible role of the federal government in making and influencing those value choices. In addition, this article examines the impact that
certain alternative courses of governmental action may have on the development of electronically aided financial services.
* Member of the California Bar. B.S., 1960, Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D.,
1966, University of Chicago.
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Catholic University Law Review

I.

[Vol. 25: 705

OVERVIEW

Because domestic financial institutions comprise the quintessential federally regulated industry, the actions of Congress and the federal regulatory
agencies will have a tremendous impact on disparate aspects of electronic
funds transfer services. Governmental action will largely determine which
institutions may enter the EFT field, the range of EFT activities that a particular institution may conduct, the organizational structure through which
EFT services may be supplied to commercial users and consumers, the rights
and obligations of commercial institutions engaging in EFT, and the rights
of consumers with respect to EFT transactions.
There are three principal forms of federal action which will directly influence the development of EFT services. The first may be found in statutes
enacted by Congress. These statutes define generally the powers of federally
chartered financial institutions, establish the national policy with respect to
competition in the private sector, define to a limited extent certain rights of
consumers with respect to financial transactions and privacy of information,
and regulate the use of telecommunications.
Subsidiary to these statutes is a second relevant form of governmental control: regulations promulgated by the various administrative agencies to which
Congress has entrusted the articulation and enforcement of national policy
which is broadly stated in the statutes. The regulations most crucial to EFT
have been, and most likely will continue to be, promulgated by those agencies
principally responsible for regulating the activities of financial institutions
chartered or insured by the federal government. Through these regulations
the agencies can define with greater specificity the powers of particular types
of financial institutions, the manner in which those powers may be exercised,
and the rules with respect to the manner in which financial institutions may
deal with their customers. In addition, because EFT services will involve
a major use of interstate telecommunications facilities, the Federal Communications Commission may assume a significant role in determining the course
of EFT development.'
A final form of federal activity which will have serious implications for
EFT activities is the ownership and operation of EFT facilities by instrumen1. See, e.g., Lee, Dialing for Dollars: Communications Regulation and Electronic
Funds Transfer Systems, 35 MD. L. lRv. 57 (1975). Mr. Lee is a Commissioner of

the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and serves as its representative to the
National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfers. The FCC's involvement in regulating EFT activities is only beginning and the issues that undoubtedly must be resolved

in determining the proper role of the FCC in that regard are still to be settled.
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talities of the federal government. Both historical precedents and recent
developments indicate that there is a likelihood that federal agencies will
attempt to extend their present roles as owners and operators of financial
service facilities into the area of electronic funds transfers. If this entrepreneurial activity becomes at all extensive, it could provide the most significant
governmental influence on EFT development.
Government action will exert a major influence on the type and rate of
innovation in financial services that institutions may offer through the use of
electronic technology. That influence springs not only from the pervasive
authority which the federal government possesses over regulated financial institutions, but also from the characteristics of technological innovation. Four
particular characteristics of technological innovation deserve special scrutiny
in connection with a consideration of the federal role in EFT: (1) Innovation implicitly requires a break from traditional ways. Statutes and regulations must be flexible enough to permit deviations from the types of financial
services presently offered and from the manner or mechanisms by which such
services are performed; (2) risk-taking, and some failures, are inherent in
the process of innovation. Some EFT efforts must be expected to fail, and
such failures must be regarded as unavoidable concomitants to the developmental process; (3) only rarely does a sweeping and fundamental change
in any industry occur in a quantum leap. A variety of efforts must be undertaken by more or less independent actors. The more successful of these
should be emulated or expanded in order for there to be pervasive, rational
change throughout an industry; (4) if innovation is to come from the private
sector, there must be incentives to take the necessary risks involved in any
attempt to develop a different service or operating system. Private enterprise
must be assured that it will not be displaced by governmentally owned services or unduly hindered by stringent regulations, or it will not invest in the
novel services and delivery mechanisms which electronic technology permits.
The foregoing indicates the manner in which the federal government could
act to influence EFT development and the characteristics of innovation that
must be considered in determining the manner in which the federal government should act. The remainder of this article examines in more detail the
potential role of the federal government and the impact which its possible
actions may have upon the development of innovative financial services.
II.

THE POWER OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
TO ENGAGE IN EFT ACTIVITIES

Federal law defines the powers of financial institutions organized under
f

fl

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 25: 705

the laws of the United States. 2 Federal law also regulates certain activities
by state-chartered institutions that are insured by federal agencies,3 or are
members of the Federal Reserve system 4 or the Federal Home Loan Bank
system." This authority enables Congress and the relevant federal agencies
to control both the entry of financial institutions into electronic funds transfer
activities and the range of such activities which may be conducted by the
various types of institutions.
The introduction of EFT has accentuated the functional distinctions
regarding the differences in ability to provide particular financial services
that exist among the various types of financial institutions. While there appears to be no per se statutory restriction on the use by any financial institution of EFT technology, the lack of authority to offer one or more consumer
financial services, or to establish new locations at which such services may
be offered, could adversely affect the nature of a financial institution's participation in EFT activities or could preclude such activities altogether. Certain powers, such as third-party payment powers, consumer credit authority,
savings deposit authority, and authority to establish additional locations at
which financial services can be supplied may, therefore, be essential to retaining a competitive posture in an EFT environment.
Because the powers of financial institutions were defined for the most part
before the potential for EFT was perceived, it is often difficult to determine
what the precise bounds of such powers should be as they relate to electronic
funds transfer. Through the regulatory authority conferred on them, government administrative agencies that regulate the various financial institutions
have attempted to clarify, and in some situations have expanded, the permissible activities of the financial institutions subject to their respective jurisdictions. By permitting such institutions to perform functions equivalent to those previously reserved to commercial banks, the agencies have
eliminated some of the traditional differences between institutions such as
commercial banks, savings and loan associations and credit unions. This regulatory and legislative erosion of the distinctions among the various types of
financial institutions has affected the EFT activities which such institutions
may undertake. For example, some federal savings and loan associations
and credit unions have acquired third-party payment powers in the form of
negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts6 and share draft accounts. 7
2. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 21-215 (1970) (National Banks); id. §§ 1464-68 (Federal
Savings and Loan Associations); id. §§ 1751-90 (Federal Credit Unions).
3. E.g., id. §§ 1811-31 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); id. §§ 1724-30
(Federal Savings Insurance Corporation).
4. Id. §§ 221-522 define the scope of the Federal Reserve System.
5. Id. H8 1421-49 define the scope of the Federal Home Loan Bank System.
6. 12 C.F.R. § 329.5(c) (4) (1976).
7. Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 721.3 (1976), the Administrator of the National Credit
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These new powers create the possibility of related electronic payments services being offered by such institutions. Moreover, the expansion of consumer lending power for federal savings and loan associations8 and federal credit
unions" may presage grants of authority for such institutions to engage in
credit card activities. Such a development would be significant because
magnetically-encoded credit cards and on-line credit card authorization systems may provide a transitional vehicle for entry into EFT. Finally, with
respect to limits on branching by financial institutions, the direct authorization by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) of the establishment
of "remote service units," 10 in truth remote retail banking facilities, and the
experimental EFT programs permitted by the National Credit Union Administration" evidence the impact of federal regulation upon the power of
various types of financial institutions to provide EFT services.
In an apparent attempt to counterbalance the expanded powers of federal
savings and loan associations and credit unions, the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System has modified the restrictions imposed on commercial banks respecting the transfer of funds between demand and interestbearing accounts.' 2 A customer now may authorize his bank by telephone
to transfer funds from his savings to his checking account. A further regulation promulgated by the Board of Governors permits preauthorized transfers
of funds from savings to checking accounts, if not done to cover overdraft
checks.' 5 The Board of Governors has issued for comment a proposed regulation that would allow a customer to authorize his bank to transfer funds
automatically from his savings to his checking account in the event of an
overdraft. 14 This proposed regulation would permit commercial banks to
provide a service similar to the NOW account. The preauthorized automatic
transfer would result in payment of interest on funds which may be withdrawn on demand. The proposed regulation does keep commercial banks
Union Administration may approve pilot programs for federal credit unions. Under this
provision, the South Providence Neighborhood Federal Credit 'Union, on February 14,
1975, requested approval of its "share draft" program. The proposed time period for
the program was to be from April 1, 1975 to December 31, 1975. At the end of the
evaluation period, the Administrator decided to authorize, on a case-by-case basis, other
qualified credit unions to adopt the same or similar programs.
8. 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.9-1, 584.2-1(b)(1)(4), 584.2-1(b)(1)(5) (1976).

9. Id.§ 700.1(j)(13) (1976).
10. Id.§ 545.4-2 (1976).
11. Id.§ 721.3 (1976).

12. Id.§ 217.152 (1976).
13. Id.§ 217.5 (1976).
14. 41 Fed. Reg. 12039 (1976).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 25:705

at a disadvantage, however, as there is a forfeiture of interest when funds
are transferred to cover an overdraft, although no such penalty is imposed
upon a withdrawal from a NOW account.
In contrast to the free-ranging regulatory authority of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, the Comptroller of the Currency is seriously restrained
by the McFadden Act' 5 in attempting to authorize national banks to establish
off-premises automated banking facilities similar to those established by federally regulated savings and loan associations and, to a more limited extent,
by federal credit unions. 16 The Comptroller's interpretive ruling of December 1974, that such off-premises facilities do not constitute "branches," and
are, therefore, not subject to the strictures of the McFadden Act. 17 The
results of all but one of numerous law suits that have challenged the interpretive ruling have been adverse to the Comptroller's view, due to the courts'
reading of the precedents under the McFadden Act.' 8 Since the Supreme
Court has refused to review the lower court decisions regarding this interpretive ruling, national banks are confined by restrictive state law treatment
of off-premises automated banking facilities while federal savings and loan
associations have been permitted to establish "remote service units" free
from such restrictions.
This anomaly was probably never contemplated, much less intended, by
Congress in adopting the statutes governing these federally chartered financial institutions. The technology that makes EFT possible did not exist when
those statutes were drafted and the expansion of the powers of savings and
loan institutions to encompass many traditional commercial bank functions
was no doubt beyond the ken of the Congress at that time.
A common feature of all the foregoing changes in powers through federal
regulation is that they have been accomplished on a piecemeal basis. This
step-by-step reduction in the distinctions among types of financial institutions
15. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).

16. See notes 10 & 11 supra.
17. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975). The interpretive ruling was suspended on October
21, 1975, in response to these numerous lawsuits challenging the Comptroller's interpretation. 40 Fed. Reg. 49077 (1975). For a discussion of the issues posed by the confrontation between the McFadden Act and EFT, see Comment, Customer-Bank Communication Terminals and the McFadden Act Definition of a "Branch Bank", 42 U. Cm. L.
REV. 362 (1975). See also Kirby, Name's the Thing: Financial Communication Device, Not Automated Teller Machine, 91 BANKING L.J. 135 (1974); Macartney, Customer-Bank Communications Terminals and Branch Banking, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 389

(1975).
18. See, e.g., State of Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 409 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976); Independent Bankers Ass'n of
America v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1975), affd, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.
1976).

1976]

The Role of the Federal Government

is inconsistent with the policy underlying the creation of the different institutions. Each type of institution was established to perform specific functions.
The original role intended for each of them was delineated in the statutes
under which each was organized and in the legislative history of those statutes. Savings and loan associations, for example, were created for the express purpose of serving as the primary lenders for residential construction
and home buying. 19 Credit unions were created to meet the credit needs
of certain identifiable groups such as employees of a particular company or
members of a particular profession or trade in a specific area. 20 It was because these institutions were intended to fulfill narrowly defined functions
that they were given certain specific benefits, such as a differential in the
interest rate they are permitted to pay on savings accounts. 21 If the fundamental distinctions among types of financial institutions are to be eliminated,
then it seems appropriate to reevaluate whether the different treatment of
these institutions under various statutes ought to be continued.
Since the statutes defining the powers of financial institutions were enacted,
not only have the powers of financial institutions changed dramatically, so
also has the environment in which financial institutions operate. Such
changes are apparent in the increasing economic interdependence of various regions of the nation, in the burgeoning of large multistate and nationwide commercial and industrial enterprises, in the concentration of productive capacity in such enterprises, in the heightened geographic mobility
of individuals, and in the advent of electronic technology. These develop19. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970).
2 (1933), states:

H.R.

REP.

No. 55, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.

The bill also provides for the Board to charter Federal savings and loan asso-

ciations in communities now insufficiently served by any institution or other
lender on homes, so that provision may be made for the financing of homes
in more than 1,500 counties in the United States now having no such facilities.
These associations are intended as permanent associations to promote thrift of
the people locally to finance their own homes and the homes of their neighbors.
20. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (Supp. V, 1975). In a report to accompany S. 1639,
the House Committee on Banking and Currency stated:

The bill is designed to provide for the Federal incorporation and supervision
of a credit union system which will make credit for provident and productive
purposes more available to people of small means . . . . At a time when industrial recovery depends upon the buying power of the masses of the people,
usurious money lending in total amounts which are now figured in billions of
dollars annually, obviously destroys vast totals of buying power represented by
the difference between what the average worker should pay for credit and what
he does pay for credit.
Credit unions are socially desirable means of self-help among wage workers
or farmers having a community of interest. . ..
H.R. REP. No. 2021, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934).
21. Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.1-.6 (1976).
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ments have altered the needs of individuals and industry alike for financial
services and, accordingly, also call for a re-examination of the powers of the
various types of financial institutions to provide the services that are needed
today.
The recent history of efforts by federal regulators to interpret present law
in light of EFT developments emphasizes the need for a major revision of
the governing statutes. Federal regulators are struggling to determine the
propriety of EFT activities of institutions under legislation that was developed
in an era when the possibility of electronic funds transfers could not have
been contemplated by Congress. The courts, in passing on these issues, have
recognized that they are powerless to change the statutes even if they no
longer reflect the economic and technological realities of the financial indus22
try.
If there is to be, as it seems there must, significant revamping of the statutes governing the powers of financial institutions, such revisions should be
based on a clear conception of the functions various types of institutions are
to perform. Furthermore, the changes ought to come through comprehensive
and balanced legislation rather than a series of disjointed enactments. These
conclusions are reinforced by the findings of the Hunt Commission and recent
hearings by the House of Representatives. 2 It is clear that such an approach
is to be preferred to the ad hoc, independent initiative of federal regulators.
It has been suggested, with some merit, that these regulators may be influenced more by the perceived needs and desires of the institutions they regulate than by consideration of the proper structure of the financial industry
or the broad requirements of the public. Hence, a major task for regulators
is to clarify, by unbiased and reasonable interpretations of existing statutes,
what powers particular types of institutions possess to provide financial services. For Congress, on the other hand, the basic issue would seem to be
whether or not existing statutes defining the powers of such institutions ought
to be modified in light of the changes in the character of such institutions
22. See, e.g., State of Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank and
Trust Co., 409 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1975).

23. The Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation (Hunt Commission) focused on problems relating to commercial banks, savings and loan associations, mutual
savings banks, credit unions, life insurance companies and pension funds. A report released by the Commission warned against piecemeal legislative action. The report observed that in order to maintain competition on equal terms it will be necessary to adopt
recommendations as a "package." This viewpoint was approved by a House Banking
and Currency Subcommittee which held hearings on financial institutions and the nation's economy. See Hearings on Financial Institutions and the Nation's Economy
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institution Supervision, Regulation & Ins. of the
House Comm. on Banking, Currency & Housing, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1976).
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and the evolution of EFT. Congress has begun this task by establishing the
24
National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfers.
The legal issues raised by the ongoing revolution in financial services are
not limited to the laws defining the powers of financial institutions. Realigning the powers of financial institutions will control only a portion of the competitive environment with respect to EFT services. It may be that nonfinancial institutions will in fact pose a greater competitive threat to commercial
banks than will other financial institutions. To the extent that financial services will be electronically based, the revenue derived by any institution from
the provision of EFT services is apt to depend, at least in part, on the portion of the total technology and equipment that is controlled by that institution. For example, assume that a point-of-sale system requires as component
parts point-of-sale terminals, communications facilities, a switch and a computer-based data facility for the maintenance of the customer account. Financial institutions alone may now perform the depository function; with
EFT in existence they must struggle for a market share of the remaining
point-of-sale components with a variety of other competitors. Every component of a point-of-sale system, including the data base that records the
deposit account, is fair game for the competitive efforts of equipment and
services companies, and the retailers in whose stores the terminals will be
located. Such competitors have been active indeed in taking steps to gain
a significant share of this market.
The entry of nonfinancial institutions, which are not subject to the same
pervasive and detailed regulations imposed upon financial institutions, into
the competitive arena requires a reconsideration of the regulatory scheme
now applicable to financial services generally. The policy considerations that
have been cited to support regulation of financial institutions may require that
24. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2401-08 (Supp. V, 1975). Section 2403 states that the function of
the Commission shall be to
conduct a thorough study and investigation and recommend appropriate administrative action and legislation necessary in connection with the possible development of public or private electronic funds transfer systems, taking into
account, among other things-(1) the need to preserve competition among the
financial institutions and other business enterprises using such a system; (2)
the need to promote competition among financial institutions and to assure
Government regulation and involvement or participation in a system competitive with the private sector be kept to a minimum; (3) the need to prevent
unfair or discriminatory practices by any financial institution or business enterprise using or desiring to use such a system; (4) the need to afford maximum user and consumer convenience; (5) the need to afford maximum user
and consumer rights to privacy and confidentiality; (6) the impact of such a
system on economic and monetary policy; (7) the implications of such a system on the availability of credit; (8) the implications of such a system ex-
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nonfinancial institutions, to the extent that they become involved in providing
such services, be similarly regulated. Alternatively, it may be determined
that those historical policy considerations simply do not apply to EFT. In
that event, financial institutions should be freed from the current restrictive
regulation of their EFT activities. Which alternative ought to be followed
is not clear. It is essential, however, that Congress decide whether such regulation ought to be extended to nonfinancial institutions or eliminated in part
as to financial institutions.
III. COMPETITION IN EFT: THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Competition has been accorded a high value in the American legal system.
It is a value that has been promoted primarily through passage of the federal
antitrust statutes and their enforcement by federal agencies. This high value is
based on the belief that free competition provides the best allocation and the
most efficient long term use of resources as well as the widest range of services and products responsive to the needs and desires of individuals and commercial enterprises. Because of this strong policy, the antitrust laws have
not been relaxed even when applied to those industries which are subject to
pervasive governmental regulation. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted in
United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank 25 that because banking is a highly regulated industry, it is all the more critical to scrutinize the competitive
implications of bank actions. The emergent state of development of EFT services, occurring in large part through the highly regulated financial industry,
makes it especially important that competition be fostered to ensure that
innovation is not hampered.
Applied to EFT, the antitrust laws will affect the manner in which institutions may provide services and the ownership and operation of facilities
through which such services will be provided. Of the many EFT activities
of financial institutions on which the antitrust laws may impact, three are of
principal concern: the formation of cooperative or joint ventures for the provision of EFT services, the scope of activities of such a cooperative EFT enterprise, and the access by competitors to EFT services provided by such an
enterprise.
The antitrust principles relevant to the organization of a cooperative EFT
entity derive from section 1 of the Sherman Act:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... 26
panding internationally and into other forms of electronic communications;
and (9) the need to protect the legal rights of users and consumers.
25. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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The Sherman Act's retrospective, behavioral test has been applied in factual
circumstances analogous to joint ventures among competitors, that is, mergers
of competing corporations. 27 In such merger cases, the test of legality is
whether the merger actually has restrained competition significantly. Any
combination among competitors, such as a joint venture, will run afoul of section 1 of the Sherman Act if it impairs competition in a particular service
which constitutes a separate "product line" and such impairment occurs in
a distinct geographical market.
In addition to regulation by section 1 of the Sherman Act, the formation
of a joint venture among competitors is subject to section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 28 The Clayton Act prescribes a prospective, structural standard against
which the propriety of cooperative action by competitors is tested. That part
of section 7 to which banks are subject 29 provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,

.

. .

any part of the stock or other share capital

. . .

where

in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
30
to tend to create a monopoly.
Unlike the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act does not require a showing of an
actual, existing restraint of trade to establish a violation. The Clayton Act
requires only a demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that a joint venture
would significantly lessen competition or produce a tendency toward monopoly. As the Court has pointed out, section 7 was intended "to arrest incipient
threats to competition" which the Sherman Act does not ordinarily reach. 3 '
Vigorous competition in EFT is important to the development of efficient
services in response to the requirements of the users of such services. Since
any joint venture among competitors poses a risk of restraint of competition
among the participants, it might be urged that no cooperative ventures ought
to be allowed in EFT. That position is unreasonable as a policy matter and
inconsistent with settled antitrust law. The Supreme Court has recognized
that some joint ventures among competing firms may not reduce actual competition at all. Collective action is justified if individual entry into the mar27. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
28.

15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).

29. Acquisitions of assets of another business by a corporation "subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission" are also subject to section 7 of the Clayton
Act.

However, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374

U.S. 321 (1963), held that national banks are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission and, thus, that the asset acquisition provisions of section 7 do
not apply to them. Id. at 335-49.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
31. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Corp., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964).
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ket is foreclosed by prohibitive costs or risks, or economies of scale. In such
circumstances, there is no existing or potential competition restrained by the
joint activity. This rationale underlies the existence of bankcard joint ventures. The member banks individually could not have launched a state-wide
bankcard program, much less a national program, because of the insuperable
financial burden, risks of loss and need for standardized operating procedures
and large-scale participation to make the program viable. A similar analysis
would be applicable to other cooperative enterprises designed to provide viable EFT services if a certain scale of operation or geographical coverage is
necessary, but is beyond the capability of a single institution.
Assuming a particular joint venture among competitors is justified under
the antitrust laws, the scope of activities permissible for that enterprise remains a major issue. One antitrust commentator, in discussing one form of
cooperative action by competitors, has observed:
From an antitrust standpoint, the principal distinction between a
trade association and the individual business enterprise is that the
former is by its very nature a combination of competitors. An association is thus halfway toward a Section 1 violation of the Sherman Act, before it even acts. What in many Sherman Act cases
is a difficult question of proof for the plaintiff, establishing the existence of a contract, combination or conspiracy, is no problem
82
whatever when a trade association is the defendant.
Except for activities that constitute per se violations of the antitrust laws,
each activity undertaken by a joint venture that might restrict competition
is subject to scrutiny to determine whether it is reasonable under the antitrust laws. One aspect of that inquiry will be a determination as to whether
an individual competitor or smaller groups would undertake such activity.
Any activity with an apparent anticompetitive effect that is not reasonable,
in view of all the attendant circumstances, will constitute a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
For a cooperative EFT enterprise to succeed, there must be considerable
joint action among the participants. Such action must be carefully limited,
however, to avoid violation of the Sherman Act. When concerted activities
by competitors, such as statistical reporting, product standardization and certification, and industry research are measured against section 1, the crucial
legal question is whether the activity actually produces an unreasonable restraint of trade. This analysis looks to the actual or, in some cases, the conclusively presumed effects of the joint venture's activities in the marketplace.
32. Dunkelberger, The Lawyer's Role in Advising the Trade Association, 10 ANTrTRusT BULL. 583, 584 (1965) (emphasis added).
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If the conduct at issue is not conclusively presumed to be anticompetitive and
the joint venture's activities do not in fact produce unreasonable anticompetitive results, then there is no violation of the Sherman Act.
Using such an analysis, certain kinds of collective action by competitors
have been approved by the courts in the face of challenges that they hampered competition in violation of the Sherman Act. For example, certification programs have been approved if the program was a reasonable effort
to provide consumers with reliable information concerning the qualities of
various products and there existed no malicious purpose to restrict competition in the establishment of standards. 88 Analogously, courts have upheld
private standardization of product design as promoting interchangeability of
parts, thus facilitating price comparison shopping and switching to different
4
suppliers.3
The operative principles in these cases appear to be that the challenged
activity must benefit competition by facilitating price comparisons, making
shifts from one supplier to another more feasible, promoting inter-connectibility, and not unduly impairing product innovation, market entry or production.
Hence, EFT standards could be adopted if they would enhance competitive
potential in EFT. This could be the case if such standards are necessary
to permit EFT operations. In any event, standards would have to be designed to minimize limitations on product innovation and entry into the EFT
market.
A cooperative EFT enterprise could undertake joint activities only if such
activities do not impose an unreasonable restraint on competition. For example, even if commonly owned terminals would impair competition, such common ownership may be justified by sound practical or policy reasons, such
as being essential to the establishment of a viable EFT enterprise. If such
a justification were shown, a court might well conclude that such terminals
may be owned in common.
Of course, the antitrust principles that apply to business generally, as well
as those specifically applicable to joint ventures, will restrict the activities of
a joint venture among competitors. So, for example, a joint venture is forbidden if there is an agreement with other businesses to fix prices,8 5 allocate
33. Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir.
1968).
34. See Turner, Antitrust Aspects of Industry Cooperation and Product Standardization, 1967 TRADE REG. REP. 50,171.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 11898), a!'d, 175 U.S. 211
(1899). Price fixing constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act. United States
v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956); United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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markets, 6 or restrict production.8 7 Certain other limitations also will apply
to its internal operations. It may not use its dominant market power with
respect to one product or service to force a customer to accept or to purchase
an unrelated good or service. 88 Such an abuse of market power is condemned as an anticompetitive "tying arrangement. '8 9
The third major area of concern is whether institutions that compete with
the owners of a cooperative EFT venture have a right of access to the service
provided by the venture. Under certain circumstances, it appears that they
may. In Associated Press v. United States,40 the United States Supreme
Court held that, in the absence of alternative sources of a service, any organization composed of competitors must permit access to its service or facility to nonowner competitors on fair and equitable terms it the service or facility is reasonably necessary for the competitive health of such nonowners.
Furthermore, if the excluded competitor can demonstrate that an ownership
position in the joint venture is a prerequisite to its competitive viability, the
joint venture may be compelled to admit the competitor to an ownership
41
position.
The Associated Press requirement of access does not imply that access so
granted is to be allowed without charge. Indeed, it seems fairly clear that
so long as the terms of access are fair and nondiscriminatory, reasonable
charges for the service may be imposed. Courts have recognized that a cooperative enterprise could deny the benefits of access to its services by setting
unreasonably high prices for such services and that this would have the same
effect as an outright refusal to permit access to such services. 42 Accordingly,
36.
Roller
per se
37.

See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). Such arrangements are also
violations of the Sherman Act.
Cf. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co.,

341 U.S. 593 (1951).

38. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Congress has adopted specific legislation to
forbid tie-ins between certain credit and other financial services. See Fair Credit Billing
Act, § 168, 15 U.S.C. § 1666g (Supp. V, 1975).
39. 356 U.S. at 5-7.
40. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
41. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See also Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. Terminal R.R.
Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). A greater showing of injury appears to be required to
entitle a competitor to admittance into the joint venture. See United States v. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).

42. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Advance Business Systems &
Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970).
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the price established may not be set in such a fashion as to deliberately exclude a competitor from use of the cooperative services or facility.
A difficult antitrust issue has been created by the evolution of statutes in
some states requiring all financial institutions that establish remote automated
facilities to share such facilities with certain or all other financial institutions.
Jonathan Rose, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division
of the United States Department of Justice, has taken the position that such
statutes will not immunize sharing of EFT facilities from attack under the
antitrust laws. Rather, Mr. Rose has urged that, notwithstanding such statutes, the activities of the sharing institutions must be justified on the same
43
basis as any other joint venture or sharing arrangement.
In espousing this position, Mr. Rose has concluded that the "state action"
of enacting a simple compulsory sharing statute is insufficient to invoke the
antitrust exemption carved out by Parker v. Brown.44 The precise limits of
the Parker exemption have never been certain. Recent developments have
created doubts that a statute directing competitors to cooperate with one another, without establishing a regulatory scheme to ensure that this cooperation
will not be exploited to the detriment of the public, will enjoy antitrust immunity. 45 The vigor with which the Antitrust Division pursues Mr. Rose's
views in this regard, and the success which it enjoys in any litigation commenced to enforce that view, may influence significantly whether EF1' ventures are organized as virtual public utilities or whether there will be competition in the establishment of basic EFT facilities, even within states that adopt
compulsory sharing statutes.
IV.

THE FEDERAL ROLE IN COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER

LAW

The primacy of the federal role is clear with respect to the antitrust laws
and the articulation of the appropriate functional scope of the activities of
financial institutions. However, the allocation by governmental rule of rights
and responsibilities identified with payment and credit transactions has
43. Address by Jonathan Rose, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, Conference on Developing Legal Issues Concerning EFT Systems, Washington, D.C., Mar. 4, 1976.
44. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
45. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S.Ct. 3110 (1976); Hecht v. Pro
Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1971); Woods
Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1971). For an excellent discussion of the difficulties
that the doctrine of Parker v. Brown may create in reconciling state enactments with the
national policy favoring competition, see Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A
Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71 (1974).
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been traditionally a matter of state, not federal, law. 46 Articles 3 and 4 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), enacted in every state but Louisiana,
set forth most of the rights of parties who exchange value by means other
than cash. The rules set forth in the UCC may be varied by agreement,
except that banks are limited by the Code in the extent to which they can
disclaim responsibility for lack of good faith or negligence. 4 7 Further, the
Code specifically anticipated, as a source of law relating to funds transfer,
federal governmental regulations issued by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. An example is Regulation J which sets forth the
rules governing the collection of checks through Federal Reserve System
facilities. 48 Under the Code, such rules have the effect of agreements that
may vary the provisions of article 4.49 Proposed amendments to Regulation
J would cover items processed electronically through automated clearing
houses.5 °
It is likely, however, that the determination of rights among participants
in EFT transactions will not result initially from governmental regulation,
state or federal. It will occur, as in fact it is occurring today, through private
agreements of the type contemplated by the drafters of the Code. An
example of a creation of private law to define the legal characteristics of an
innovative consumer value transfer service occurred when bank credit cards
were introduced. Prior to the mid-1960's, bank charge card services were
offered by a few individual banks to selected customers; merchants with
which they had direct depository relationships and consumers for whom they
maintained open-ended credit accounts. The resultant two party contracts
defined the legal characteristics of the charge card service offered by each
individual bank.
The creation in the mid-1960's of Interbank Card Association, regional
bankcard associations such as Eastern States Bankcard Association and West46. There were those, however, who advocated a federal commercial code when the
body of law that now constitutes the Uniform Commercial Code was being drafted.
See generally Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 100 (1951); Schnader, The Uniform Commercial Code-Today &
Tomorrow, 22 Bus. LAw. 229, 231-32 (1966).
47. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-103(1) provides:
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement except
that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack of good
faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or can limit the measure of damages
for such lack or failure; but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which such responsibility is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
48. 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1976).
49. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-103(2).
50. Proposed amendments to FRB Reg. J, 38 Fed. Reg. 32952 (1973); revised proposed amendment to FRB Reg. J, 41 Fed. Reg. 3097 (1976).
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ern States Bankcard Association,51 and National BankAmericard Incorporated introduced a new phenomenon: commonly identifiable bankcards issued by many institutions which could be honored under uniform terms and
conditions throughout the United States and the world. The "law" applicable
to bankcard transactions, as it is seen by any individual who uses or accepts
credit cards as a method of payment, is still defined primarily by the bilateral
agreement between the bank and the customer or merchant. However, the
individual banks must now interface with each other and that, in turn, influences the content of such agreements. Just as the legal characteristics that
define transactions found in articles 3 and 4 of the Code, the "legal" characteristics of credit card transactions were of necessity reduced to codifications
by the multi-bank systems. Those codifications are found today in multilateral "operating rules" to which banks that participate in such systems are
bound.

52

Since the bankcard service was innovative and rapidly evolving, the flexibility offered by the ability to make rules through private contract permitted
adjustments to those relationships as experience indicated. If the government had attempted to dictate the governing rules prior to initiation of the
new services, bankcard systems might have followed a different evolutionary
pattern, which subsequently might have resulted in a less desirable service
53
for the public.
51. There are now in excess of a dozen such regional groupings that process Master
Charge transactions.
52. Examples of such bodies of private law are the Operating Rules of Western States
Bankcard Association, and the rules issued by Interbank Card Association. These rules
govern transactions that occur in a seven state area and transactions that involve interchange on a national basis, respectively. Although such rules by their terms bind only
the participating bank members of the bankcard system, the banks in turn, as a practical
matter, incorporate into their individual agreements with the consumers and merchants
many of the operational requirements and allocations of rights contained in the rules.
53. The conclusion that private enterprise has done a better job than government
would have may seem brash. It is premised first on the clear superiority, in terms of
flexibility, of allowing such decisions to be made by private agreement. As a second
premise, the conclusion postulates superior knowledge of operational, technical and marketing problems within private industry than would likely be found in either a state legislature or Congress. What is absent, of course, in private rule-making is the protection
of the "public interest" that would be afforded by public officials. To some extent free
market competition and enlightened self-interest mandates the inclusion of public interest considerations in the derivation of rules. A good example of that phenomenon is
the inclusion of the right given to consumers to reverse preauthorized automated payments which was included in the initial rules of the California Automated Clearing
House Association. See Homrighausen, One Large Step Toward Less-Check: The California Automated Clearing House System, 28 Bus. LAw. 1143, 1152-53 (1973). The
fact that the government has not felt compelled to legislate comprehensive statutes to
govern bankcard transactions is at least one further indication that the private law development process has worked well,
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That experience now is being replicated in large part in the development
of EFT services. For example, the rights and obligations of users of automated clearing houses are established by private agreements, the rules of the
clearing houses, and the agreements between participating financial institutions and their customers. Nevertheless, the dialogue is intensifying on the
subject of whether new governmental rules are necessary to regulate EFT
transactions and, if so, whether those rules should be promulgated at the state
or federal level. As indicated above, the Federal Reserve Board has proposed on two occasions amendments to Regulation J that would cover electronic transfer of funds on credit items and electronic transfer of funds on
debit items.14 Given the Federal Trade Commission's apparent current perception of its powers and responsibilities, it may arrogate to itself an early
and active role in regulating EFT. A nongovernmental body, the Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, has created a committee,
designated the "348 Committee," to determine whether changes should be
recommended to articles 3, 4 and 8 of the UCC to accomodate the unique
characteristics of EFT transactions. If the drafting of rules is needed,
the process will be time consuming and apt to proceed more slowly than the
introduction of technological innovation.
This article is not the appropriate vehicle for predicting what the characteristics of new laws directed at EFT will be. Still, a few observations
may be offered. Articles 3 and 4 clearly are inadequate in themselves to
deal with EFT transactions and additional legislation may ultimately be desirable, but the articles were drafted so as to be flexible and to allow the
creation of payment mechanisms by private agreement and clearing house
rule. They are, therefore, unlikely to restrict the development of EFT transactions. Moreover, because of the diverse nature of electronic transactions
currently under discussion, it is unlikely that any one set of undifferentiated
rules will adequately govern EFT transactions as a single generic category.
For instance, the rules respecting preauthorized payments adopted by the various automated clearing house associations allow consumers an absolute right
of return for any debit item which they assert to be an error. 55 This right
goes beyond the traditional stop-payment right with regard to checks, and
beyond the right a customer has to reverse an entry with his bank because
an item has been improperly paid through forgery or alteration. It may well
be that an absolute right of return would be inappropriate if the electronic
funds transaction at issue was a point-of-sale transaction, one specifically authorized by the customer.
54. See note 49 & accompanying text supra.

55. California Automated Clearing House Association Operating Rules, Section VIII
(A); National Automated Clearing House Association Rules, Section VIII(A).

1976]

The Role of the Federal Government

The federal government will undoubtedly play a role in regulating
EFT transactions. The only question is how comprehensive that role will
be. Congress has already enacted policies that will affect EFT transactions
to some extent and the instances in which federal regulation is being imposed
on related transactions appear to be increasing. For example, Congress has
already legislated with respect to bankcard transactions to dramatically alter
the immunity of financial institutions from disputes arising out of the underlying transaction through which goods or services are provided. The doctrine
of negotiability and holder in due course provide that immunity, and they
have allowed holders and payors of checks to be uninvolved in the business
transaction between the drawer and, typically, the payee. Although the
bankcard transaction is in many respects functionally similar to the check as
a payment transaction, the rights of the parties to the transaction were redefined by Congress in 1974 when it passed the "rights of credit card customers" provision in the Fair Credit Billing Act. 56 The provision allows a consumer to assert claims and defenses, arising out of a transaction in which a
credit card has been used, against the bank that issued the bankcard to the
consumer. Congress placed careful limitations upon the new right, however,
in recognition of the unique characteristics of the transaction to which the
legislation spoke.5 7 The rule will apply to third party credit card transactions
whether they are paper or electronically based. The existence of such legislation raises an inevitable question regarding the appropriate treatment of
electronic debit transactions that are card activated and involve a subsidiary
credit extension. 58 If an EFT transaction has no credit component, a dialogue will ensue regarding whether it should be analogized to a cash transaction or a check transaction. Cash payments are, of course, final when made.
Proponents of the latter analogy will point to the power possessed by the con56. Fair Credit Billing Act § 170, 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (Supp. V, 1975); FRB Reg.
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(i) (1976).
57. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, there were strident calls for the complete
elimination of the loosely termed "holder-in-due course" protection for bankcard issuers.

The concept of the compromise proposal embodied in section 170 of the Fair Credit
Billing Act was first suggested in Brandel & Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash

or New Credit, 69 MicH. L. REv. 1033, 1056-71 (1971). Prior to the adoption by Congress of the compromise, the State of California enacted a similar rule (CAL. CiV. CODE
§ 1747.90 (West 1973)) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws included in its draft of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code a rule patterned
after the California provision (UNIFORM CONSUMER CRDrr CODE § 3.403).
58. An example of such a transaction is an EFT debit transaction that substitutes
for a check. If the checking account has an over-draft line of credit associated with

it, a payment may result in an extension of credit if the account balance drops below
zero.
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sumer to stop payment prior to payment of a check,5 9 and ask that a similar
artificial right be created in EFT transactions.
Congress has also passed, in the Fair Credit Billing Act, a detailed statement of the rights of consumers and the duties of creditors in those situations
in which errors appear in the periodic statement of account supplied by creditors.60 Further, the Federal Reserve 'Board, when it promulgated extensive
amendments to Regulation Z, included detailed an extensive requirements
for the disclosure of specific items of information in a descriptive billing context. 61 It is obvious, of course, that a periodic recordation of EFT transactions will be provided to consumers in a descriptive billing format. The present descriptive billing disclosure rules apply only to open-end credit transactions. However, because of the continuing integration of time, demand and
credit accounts, the practical effect of Regulation Z is nowhere near as finite
as it might appear at first glance, in terms of either direct application or indirect influence. The detailed disclosure and error resolution requirements contained in Regulation Z are apt to play a major role in shaping consumer expectations and the systems requirements for data accumulation, transmittal,
storage and disclosure to the consumer in EFT transactions. Further, they
may provide a pattern for future legislation. Additional specific subjects for
legislative treatment are likely to be recommended to Congress by the Nation62
al Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers.
Legislators and regulators ought to proceed carefully in the uncharted
waters of EFT and regulate, at least initially, only where there is a clear and
demonstrated need, and not because of a fear of some potential, ill-defined
harm. Regulation will have an impact on the rights and obligations of consumers, on the operational characteristics of EFT systems and on the price
of EFT services. It will be to the advantage of the public if facts with regard
to the technical and economic considerations involved in regulating EFT
transactions are known and not merely hypothesized, and if legitimate con59. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-303 (1).
60. Fair Credit Billing Act §§ 161-63, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666 to 1666b (Supp. V, 1975);
FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.14 (1975).
61. 12 C.F.R. § 226.7 (1976). Descriptive billing is a term that identifies a billing
process in which the original document produced at the time and place the transaction
occurred, frequently bearing the customer's signature, is not returned to the customer.
A paper receipt is frequently provided at the time of the transaction. However, the sole
record of the transaction provided directly by the institution that maintains the account is
a statement on which data, typically extracted from a computerized record, is printed.
The alternative to descriptive billing is termed "country club billing." Under this billing
procedure actual copies of the document evidencing the credit transaction are cleared
through the banking system and are returned to the customer with his periodic statement.
62. The EFT Commission was established to study, inter alia, "the need to protect
the legal rights of users and consumers." 12 U.S.C. § 2403(a)(9) (Supp. V, 1975).
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sumer expectations and apprehensions can be dealt with after some experience with an operating consumer service. When regulation comes, it should
be promulgated at the federal level and the rules should preempt any state
laws dealing with the same subject matter. The high mobility of our population and the close interconnection and interfacing of interstate institutions in
our economy require no less.8 3 The essential ingredient, uniformity, can otherwise be achieved only by a state by state adoption of a model or uniform
act. That road to uniformity is slow, tortuous and uncertain. Some states
may vary the model act to the point that its value as a uniform law would be
vitiated.
V.

PRIVACY AND SECURITY

Privacy is one aspect of the operation of electronic funds transfer services
that will most certainly be the subject of federal regulation. The protection
of the individual's privacy has been the focus of increasing attention in the
past five years. Major studies"4 on the subject have been and are in the
process of being conducted.6 5 Legislation at both the federal and state level
has already been enacted; 6 much additional legislation has been introduced6 7
63. Senator William Proxmire, then Chairman of the Subcommittee on Consumer
Affairs of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, and now Chairman of the full committee, argued the necessity of congressional action to assure uniformity at the federal level with respect to matters covered by the Fair Credit Billing Act.
119 CONG. REc. 4586-603 (1973). Unfortunately, uniformity was not achieved. The
present rule regarding the relationship of federal to state laws with respect to consumer
legislation (Fair Credit Billing Act § 171, 15 U.S.C. § 1666j (Supp. V, 1975); Equal
Credit Opportunity Act Amendments, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691 (1976)) presents an undesirable model if what is sought is understandable, comprehensive and consistent rules to
which American business can adhere and consumers can relate. The rule mandates federal preemption only if a state law is inconsistent and if the state law does not give
greater protection to consumers. The philosophy embodied in the provision may be
superficially acceptable since it seems to offer the possibility of greater protection for
consumers at the cost of consistency from state to state. The superficial desirability
wears thin when the difficulty of attempting to apply Congress' rule to specific issues
becomes apparent.
64. See, e.g., HEW, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973) (Official Report of the Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems to the
Secretary of HEW); J. Rule, Value Choices in Electronic Funds Transfer Policy, Oct.
1975 (Office of Telecommunications Policy Study).
65. Both the Privacy Protection Study Commission (5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. IV,
1974)) and the National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer (12 U.S.C. § 2401
(Supp. IV, 1974)) are studying various aspects of privacy.
66. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1970); Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1681t (1970); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.1, 1786 (West Supp.
1976); Massachusetts Fair Credit Reporting Law, MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 93, §§ 50-68
(as added by Acts 1971, ch. 805); N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 50, art. 18 (1953), as amended
by Laws 1969, ch. 259; Credit Data Reporting Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAw ch. 300, §
370 et seq. (McKinney 1970).
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and even the constitution of one state, California, has been amended to secure the right of privacy to its citizens. 68 The judiciary has also been creating
protections where legislators have not acted.69
The technology that can permit electronic funds transfer is the same technology that could theoretically permit the instantaneous aggregation of formidable quantities of information about the lives and habits of individuals.
Those who understand the technological potential of electronic systems, but
who do not always seem to understand the economic limitations on that potential, worry about the capability that technology provides to follow the
movements and habits of individuals on an instantaneous basis through the
economic transactions in which that individual participates. It is technologically feasible to determine from where and at what time persons make telephone calls, to what telephones those calls were made and to whom the calls
were made. It is possible to determine on what days an individual patronizes
particular stores and it may be possible to determine what goods or services
were purchased. Plans have been advocated to record automatically the
passage of automobiles at toll collection stations. Such a system would allow
the monitoring of the location of vehicles and the times they were at particular locations. Adjustment of computerized fare collection programs now installed in public transportation systems, such as that used by the Bay Area
Rapid Transit System in San Francisco, could allow similar monitoring of the
movements of individuals by recording the boarding and destination stations
of individuals and the time of entrance and exit from the system. The above
examples demonstrate that in an increasingly complex and technological society records can be kept of transactions that were unrecorded in the past. People are not only concerned about the recording of monetary activity, but the
recording of activities that transcend financial matters and include nearly all
aspects of their lives. They are concerned about the accuracy of the information that is recorded and the uses to which it might be put.
The mere existence of such vast quantities of information about individuals
produces apprehension. That apprehension can be reduced through three
fundamental controls: limitations on data collection, methods to insure accuracy, and limitations on access. Congress has already begun to legislate
with respect to each of these controls.
67. E.g., H.R. 1984, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 3057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
68. CAL. CONST. amend. art. I, § 1 (1974).
69. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); United States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
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In 1970 Congress took the first step in controlling personal information
flow by passing the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 70 With regard to financial
information, the Act controls primarily credit bureau type activities which,
in the language of the Act, are termed "consumer reporting agencies." The
Act attempts to regulate the content, currentness and accuracy of data collected and stored and the purposes for which persons may have access to such
information. A primary technique for insuring accuracy is the guaranteed
accessibility by individuals to their own files so that the contents might be
verified. The provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act would apply to
71
the EFT environment without amendment.
The use which government might make of personal information in its possession is one of the public's greatest fears, and one to which Congress directed its attention through the passage of the Privacy Act of 1974.72 The
Act provides standards to ensure the relevancy and accuracy of information
maintained by government agencies and to control the purposes for which
the information may be stored and disclosed. Although under the provisions
of the Act citizens have no control over the compilation of data by an agency,
such data cannot be disclosed to any other person or agency without the written request or consent of the individual concerned. This prohibition on dissemination, however, is weakened by broad exceptions, the scope of which
are yet to be determined. Like the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Privacy
Act insures that citizens have the ability to inspect their files to ensure accuracy.
The government's access to information maintained by the private sector
is also a serious concern. A major issue at the early hearings of the Privacy
Protection Study Commission, for instance, was the lack of protection for citizens in those situations where the government seeks access to information
maintained by the private sector of the economy. 78 Serious questions exist
as to whether governmental access to personal information in the hands of
certain private third parties should be permitted. In our highly complex society some third parties are injected into what previously was a private transaction only because such third parties own and maintain the complex, expensive
Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr.
553 (1975); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr.
166 (1974).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1681t (1970).
71. Attempts to amend the Act, for other reasons, have been made since 1973. E.g.,
S. 2360, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1970). That law applies only to personal data systems operated or controlled by federal agencies or instrumentalities.
73. See American Banker, Feb. 25, 1976, at 8, col. 1; American Banker, Feb. 13,
1976, at 1, col. 1.
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technological devices through which the transaction must be accomplished.
As institutions within the private sector become more sensitive to these issues,
they are resisting requests by governmental agencies for access to personal
data on customers. The response of financial institutions to judicial process
that compels disclosure is another matter. Absent action by legislatures or
state courts that guarantees to consumers the right to prior notification and
opportunity to resist such orders, financial institutions have no choice but to
comply with judicial and administrative orders that frequently do not allow
74
for such due process rights.
A related concern is that of security of the information and the "value"
that is being conveyed by EFT systems. A criminal with a good technological background need no longer raise a sweat lifting bags of greenbacks from
a Brink's truck. It would be physically less demanding and far more lucrative to steal by diverting the stream of value transfer from an EFT system.
The concern for security is one that should be shared by the individual customer who will be inconvenienced or harmed by the diversion of either information or value and by the financial institution whose continued viability
might be threatened.
The regulators of financial institutions impose security requirements on financial transactions accomplished through their regulated institutions as a
major aspect of their administrative responsibility. The concern for security
is expressed by the careful manner in which financial institutions are regulated generally to ensure the safety of deposited funds and through specific
legislation such as the Bank Protection Act. 75 The Comptroller of the Currency has issued proposed guidelines that deal extensively with suggestions
for the security of EFT systems, 70 and other federal regulatory bodies no
doubt will establish similar controls as they deem appropriate.
Although the need for proper security in EFT is unquestionable, it is important to ensure that the rules to be adopted will, in fact, provide the necessary protection without unduly restricting the development of new uses of
electronic technology. Regulations adopted to protect security and privacy
74. See generally Note, Government Access to Bank Records, 83 YALE L.J. 1439
(1974). In United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976), the Court recently held that
the validity of a subpoena directed to a bank to obtain copies of checks could not be
challenged by a depositor, because a depositor has no constitutionally protected interest
in records maintained by the bank. The Miller case renders it unlikely that the federal
judiciary will be a source of new law to protect individual rights in financial records
in the near future. Compare Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590,
118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974) and Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542
P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975).
75. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1729, 1881-84 (1970).
76. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EFTS GUIDELINES (Apr. 1976).
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will affect the design of EFT systems and the costs of the financial services
offered through EFT. In some instances, policies based on privacy and security considerations in EFT transactions will be antithetical to other strongly
held policies in the EFT area. For example, in an earlier discussion, we
touched on the importance which the Federal Reserve Board and some state
legislatures are attaching to the adequacy of information disclosed on descriptive billing statements that recount electronic transactions. To the extent that
the Board is successful in expanding the quantity of information required to
be accumulated and stored, it has created not only the possibility but the likelihood that such information will be available to institutions for purposes extraneous to the transaction itself. Furthermore, the type and quantity of information that the law allows to be maintained and shared among creditgranting institutions will significantly affect the accuracy of creditworthiness
evaluations, the costs of extending credit, and therefore the price to consumers. Difficult decisions will have to be made as these conflicting societal
needs become more fully appreciated.
VI.

OPERATION OF

EFT FACILITIES

BY FEDERAL AGENCIES

The United States Government traditionally has avoided participation in
the nation's economy as a direct provider of goods and services. Services
that have tended towards a natural monopoly or tightly controlled oligopoly
have been regulated, but not operated, by the government. 77 Where governmental subsidization has been judged to be necessary, the subsidy has either
been granted directly to the beneficiaries 78 or has been funded through independent corporations. 79 Even basic infra-structures of the economy, such as
communications services, are either privately operated or are provided
through quasi-public companies such as the United States Postal Service and
the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT).
In contrast to this general pattern, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal
Reserve Banks, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and the
Federal Home Loan Banks have taken significant steps in the direction of
establishing governmentally owned and operated components of EFT systems. For instance, the Federal Reserve System, through its Reserve Banks,
has been operating automated clearing houses on behalf of banks in the
77. The telephone industry, for example, is regulated by the Federal Communications
Commission (Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 47 U.S.C.)); and the airlines industry is regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board (Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (codified in scattered

sections of 49 U.S.C.)).
78, E.g., Health Insurance for the Aged Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-96 (1970) (Medicare).
79. E.g., Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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United States since late 1972, when the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco began performing data processing and communications functions for the
automated clearing house facility established by the California Automated
Clearing House Association. s0 Various Federal Reserve Banks now operate
automated clearing houses in more than 17 locations.
The operational participation of the Federal Home Loan Bank System and
the Federal Reserve System is not a new phenomenon. They already operate certain payment system services, some in competition with private enterprise, the classic example of which is the provision by the Federal Reserve
System of check clearing services for commercial banks. The Federal Reserve System has not limited itself to paper-based services. It has established
the "Fedwire" and the associated Culpepper Message Switching Center.
In addition, the various Federal Home Loan Banks throughout the United
States now provide general computerized recordkeeping and transactionrecording services to aid their member savings and loan associations.
Considerable criticism has been directed at the Federal Reserve System
because of the operational role it has assumed; criticism that is equally applicable to the activities of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. The difference in the degree of criticism directed at the two agencies is due in part
to the public forum for criticism provided by the Federal Reserve Board. No
such specific opportunity for public comment has been afforded by the
FHLBB. In November 1973 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System issued proposed amendments to Regulation J.81 At that time, the
Board of Governors requested public comment on who should own and operate electronic payment facilities. The more than 200 responses from private
industry and governmental agencies indicated an overwhelming opposition to
governmental agencies acting as owners and operators of EFT systems as a
matter of policy.8 2 A further argument was advanced that the Federal Reserve, as an agency whose functions are specifically delineated by statute,
does not possess the legal power to engage in EFT activities. 88
80. See Homrighausen, supra note 53, at 1143-46.
81. 38 Fed. Reg. 32952 (1973). 'Present FRB Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210
(1976) sets forth the rules for the collection of paper items, including checks. The
proposed amendments set forth rules to govern the electronic transfer of both credits
and debits.
82. See Brandel & Gresham, Electronic Payment: Government Intervention or New
Frontier for Private Initiative, 29' Bus. LAw. 1133 (1974), for a sampling of many of
the issues raised by private institutions opposed to a Federal Reserve System operational
role. See generally Comments of the United States Department of Justice in the Matter
of Proposed Amendment of Regulation J and Related Issues Before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 14, 1974.
83. Citicorp, Comments on the Federal Reserve Board's Revised Proposal to Amend
Regulation J 8-11, Mar. 1976.
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The responses from various elements of the banking industry were not uniform; some were not even internally consistent in the policies advocated. Segments of the banking industry, for instance, took the position that Federal
Reserve Banks' operation of automated clearing houses (ACHs) was desirable, but that Federal Reserve operation of facilities involving point-of-sale
transactions was anticompetitive and undesirable. Furthermore, the banking
industry in at least two cities, Cleveland and Atlanta, continued to press the
Federal Reserve Board to permit the Reserve Banks in those cities to operate
electronic facilities to support bank-owned point-of-sale transaction services.8 4 In response to these views, the Board declined to permit the Reserve Banks to operate an electronic switch for point-of-sale systems in
Cleveland and Atlanta. Further, in its release accompanying revised proposed amendments to Regulation J, dated January 19, 1976, the Federal
Reserve System, which had made no overt efforts to expand its operational
role in EFT since late 1973, except in its operation of ACHs, disclaimed the
applicability of its regulations to point-of-sale systems or consumer bank communications terminals.8 5
In March 1975, the FHLBB issued a request for detailed systems specifications for the construction of a nationwide electronic funds transfer system.
That activity was followed by an announcement of the Federal Home Loan
Bank in San Francisco in September 1975 that it intended to operate an EFT
program called "ASSIST" on behalf of the Savings Association Central Corporation, an organization comprised of 13 of the largest savings and loan associations in the State of California. 80 Shortly thereafter, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice communicated a strongly worded statement
to the Chairman of the FHLBB suggesting that the operation of any such facilities by a Home Loan Bank would be inappropriate.8 7 The ASSIST plan
was shelved in early November 1975.188 No reasons were publicly given, but
the Board may simply have viewed as impolitic the continuation of the project
in the face of strong Justice Department opposition. If the Home Loan Bank
had proceeded as planned, commercial banks might well have encouraged,
instead of opposed, Federal Reserve System operational services. They may
have had no choice if savings and loan associations had gained a significant
competitive advantage through governmentally subsidized services.
84. See 6 Payment Systems Newsletter, Jun. 1974, at 1.

85. 41 Fed. Reg. 3098 (1976).

The regulations themselves do not make it clear,

however, that they cannot be so applied.
86. CAL. SAy. & LOAN J., Oct. 1975, at 14.

87. Letter from Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, to Garth Marston, Acting Chairman, FHLBB, Oct.
16, 1975.

88. CAL. SAV. & LOAN J., Dec. 1975, at 11.
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Protests by the Justice Department, the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy and private industry have resulted in both the Federal
Reserve System and the FHLBB slowing markedly what was feared by many
to be a premature and undesirable entry into the electronic transfer environment. Such entry might well have foreclosed private initiative, producing an
artificial distortion of marketplace forces during the nascent stage of EFT development.
The development of an electronic payments system serving the needs of
a broad user population at maximum efficiency requires an environment in
which flexibility, diversity and specialization of functions are fostered and the
necessary evolutionary growth in alternative mechanisms is allowed to occur
at a pace dictated by market forces. The innovative and competitive characteristics of private industry are suited to produce an electronic payments
system tailored to the most efficient delivery of the services that are desired
by institutional and consumer users. Private enterprise possesses the necessary range of financial and technological capabilities that are not apt to be
found in any single institution, private or governmental. Moreover, competitive interaction fosters anticipation of user demand and would go far in insuring that services and systems will be ready when the demand occurs.
Although no monopoly can be viewed as desirable in the emerging EFT
environment, a federal agency may be the least desirable monopolist of all.8 9
Characteristically, governmental bureaucracies seem to respond to incentives
different from those that influence private sector decisions. In contrast to
the private sector, even risk taking that proves successful is not rewarded
highly in government. A bureaucrat is more likely to give greater weight to
the dangers posed by any innovation to his agency and his career and conclude that they significantly outweigh the potential enhancement in efficiency
or service which the innovation might achieve.
Further, the public welfare is served best by determining the desires of the
public through their free market dollar votes and their political votes. Consumers, regulatory agencies and users of EFT systems, such as commercial
banks, may all have differing opinions as to how the public weal and their
own interests might be best served. The multitude of voices to be heard on
any issue should be, and .clearly has been, productive of invaluable discussion
89. A similar conclusion appears to have been reached in most countries that have
established automated facilities. See 8 Payment Systems Newsletter, Mar. 1976, at
6. Although the Canadian government has taken the position that Canada should have
a single common user communications network, it has not yet decided who should own

and control that network.
TRONIC PAYMENTS SYSTEM

See generally
(1975).

INFORMATION CANADA,

TOwARDS AN ELEC-
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and public resolution of policy and operational direction. The federal government, of course, will exert significant influence on EFT systems as a regulator. It may be a major user of such services, as it is today the primary
user of ACHs. 90 If it were also to own and operate EFT facilities, too much
decisional power would be concentrated in a single institution and this would
effectively stifle differing views.
Fears expressed in 1973, as to the necessity for governmental intervention
because private industry was not sufficiently innovative or was unwilling to
assume the risks necessary to implement EFT services, or that smaller banks
would be unable to participate, seem groundless in retrospect. Individual
banks, 91 large and small, 9 2 and joint ventures of banks 93 in all parts of the
country have introduced electronically based consumer services. The same
is true of nonbank depository institutions. 94 Major regional automated clearing house associations in Chicago and New York have chosen to operate their
own facilities even though the service has been available from local Federal
Reserve Banks at no direct cost to the commercial banks. 95 Both National
'BankAmericard, Inc. 96 and Interbank Card Association 97 have in operation
90. Statistics published in NACHA Quarterly Update Bulletin of the National Automated Clearing House Association, Jan. 1976, at 5, indicate that approximately 45% of
the credit transactions processed by automated clearing houses were governmental in origin. In correspondence between the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) and
the Department of the Treasury, OTP has requested that Treasury consider using private
agencies to transmit governmental payments. Citicorp, supra note 83, App. III.
91. See, e.g., 8 Payment Systems Newsletter, Mar. 1976, at 3, 4 (Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. and First Nat'l Bank of Chicago); 5 Payment Systems Newsletter, Nov. 1973, at 1 (First Nat'l City Bank of New York).
92. See, e.g., 5 Payment Systems Newsletter, Jan. 1973, at 1, 3 (Hempstead Bank,
Long Island, N.Y., and City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., Columbus, Ohio). A survey conducted by the Comptroller of the Currency indicated that as of November 18, 1975,
more than half of all electronic funds transfer systems installed by national banks have
been deployed by small banks. American Banker, Dec. 26, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
93. See, e.g., 7 Payment Systems Newsletter, Apr. 1975, at 7 (Credit Systems, Inc.).
94. See, e.g., CAL. SAy. & LOAN J., Sep. 1975, at 18 (California saving and loan associations' formation of Savings Association Central Corp.); 7 Payment Systems Newsletter, Jan. 1974, at 1 (Transmatic Money Service System offered by First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Lincoln, Nebraska); 5 Payment Systems Newsletter,
Feb. 1973, at 3 (mutual savings banks MINTS program).
. 95. 7 Payment Systems Newsletter, Nov. 1975, at 2. Such a decision by regional
clearing house associations is a powerful statement as to the importance with which private banks view their ability to compete freely.
96. The BankAmericard Service Exchange (BAS) programs, BASE I, II and III,
are described in 6 Payment Systems Newsletter, Jan. 1974, at 6, and 5 Payment Systems Newsletter, Sep. 1973, at 1.
97. Interbank's on-line authorization service (INAS) is described in 6 Payment Systems Newsletter, Jan. 1974, at 7, and 5 Payment Systems Newsletter, May 1973,
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systems that allow for computer-to-computer communications and the truncation of paper in nationwide interchange. Those systems may well provide
the basic communications links for future point-of-sale and consumer bank
communications terminal services.
Importantly, this substantial progress has not been made at the sacrifice
of flexibility and diversity-two essential conditions to successful innovation.
The multiplicity of projects differ one from another. Some programs, because they will not satisfy user needs at an appropriate price, will undoubtedly fail or will be significantly altered to meet user requirements. But the
end product of such competition will likely be superior services at the lowest
possible cost for the consumer. Such a result would be far less probable if
the Federal Reserve Board or the FHLBB interfere operationally or by rulemaking and places constraints on innovation. Only with great luck could government planners anticipate all problems and opportunities so as to design the
best system in the first instance. Once in place, a governmentally owned national monopoly would be slow to change and probably impossible to displace. There is little incentive for innovating to increase efficiency if there
is no limitation of resources and little reward for reducing the cost of expanding the quality or kind of services.
The facts are, of course, that while the phenomenon of governmental
agency ownership of EFT systems has been slowed, the Federal Reserve System continues to assume an important role in its operation of automated
clearing houses. Further, the Federal Home Loan Banks provide electronic
services to savings and loan associations. Any component of an electronic
payment system that is owned and operated by a governmental agency is likely to become a near monopoly unless the services that component provides
are priced at their true cost. If the agency charges nothing, or less than actual costs for its services, users will perceive a lower cost associated with use
of the services than their true economic cost. They will, therefore, continue
to utilize it, regardless of available alternatives that are less costly and more
efficient but carry a higher price to users. An inefficient system could exclude more efficient alternatives from developing, thus resulting in the expenditure of more resources than necessary to accomplish the desired function.
Governmental subsidization of EFT facilities would render it difficult, if
not impossible, for private industry to compete in the provision of those services. This artificial restriction on competition would severely curtail innovation in the development of services and technology, and virtually insure that
at 4; its electronic transfer service (INET) is described in 6 Payment Systems Newsletter, Jul. 1974, at 4.
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electronic payment systems would configure themselves to a public utility
model, regardless of the benefits, or lack thereof, to the public. The size
of government and its ability to create systems without the private market
penalties associated with poor decisionmaking are factors in themselves that
operate to restrict private competition in any activity government undertakes.
If the government charges for its services, and sets its prices so that they
are based on the services' true cost, 'the pernicious effects of government's
operational role on private competition may be somewhat reduced. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System took a major step in that
direction when it announced that it was in the process of formulating a price
schedule based on fully allocated costs for the electronic clearing and transfer
services and for the check clearing services it currently offers. Such pricing,
if implemented, will represent an essential step in reducing the possibility that
an artificial monopoly in EFT services will arise. The establishment of appropriate prices based on costs, however, may not be an easy task for the
Board.
Even fully allocated cost pricing for "the service" may not be sufficient
to insure minimal governmental interference with the private sector of the
economy. It would be undesirable to treat a set of services as a single package, available only on an "all or nothing" basis. Component parts of the
service should be offered and priced separately so that the private sector
could provide for itself those components it can produce most efficiently, and
purchase only those components that the government is able to offer most
economically. For example, in the automated clearing house context, access
to the Federal Reserve System's courier service might be separately priced
and offered to privately operated automated clearing houses.98 Care should
be taken to insure that the pricing of one component service does not operate
to subsidize any other component service. Such an unbundling of prices, the
antithesis of the tie-in of products allegedly attempted by companies with a
controlling share of a market, would have a beneficial effect on the rapidity
of growth, price and health of EFT systems.
Another type of tie-in that exists peculiar to the relationship between the
Federal Reserve System and its member banks is the mandated reserve balance. The Federal Reserve Board indicated in the explanatory material accompanying the January, 1976 Regulation J proposal that "consideration
would have to be given to the burden of required reserves maintained by
member banks" in setting the price schedule. If a concession on pricing is
given to member banks, they will perceive utilization of the Federal 'Reserve
98. The Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Chicago have proposed to offer
such a courier service to the privately operated New York and Chicago Automated
Clearing Houses, provided these institutions do not discriminate against thrift institutions
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System's electronic payments service as a significant means through which
they can receive economic benefits from the reserve accounts they are required to maintain. This tie-in will distort the economic basis on which
choices between alternative electronic payment services are made. Private
industry does not have the right, as does the Federal Reserve, to demand
that income producing assets of banks be left in its care without compensation. Hence, while the Federal Reserve can offer to return part of the economic benefit it earns annually from those assets, without consequence to itself, private industry can obviously offer no similar economic subsidy. The
distortion will make it difficult for private industry to attract member banks
as customers, even though the private services may be superior in quality,
breadth and economic efficiency. The public will, in the end, have to pay
for any resulting inefficiencies. Moreover, unless each member bank's use
of the Federal Reserve services is in proportion to the size of its reserve, service price concessions will result in the subsidization of services provided to
some member banks by other member banks.
The Board's desire to encourage banks to become members of the Federal
Reserve System for purposes of monetary policy, and its at least partially related desire to provide some economic benefit for the maintenance of reserves, should not be accomplished by providing "free" or subsidized services.
Rather, member banks should be directly compensated for the loss of earnings occasioned by maintenance of reserve accounts with Federal Reserve
Banks. One alternative, which the authors suggested in 1973, would be to
pay interest on reserves.9 9 Milton Friedman, the eminent economist, has
made that same suggestion before the House Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing during hearings conducted as part of that Committee's
study of Financial Institutions and the National Economy. 10 0 The American
Bankers Association, the voice of commercial banking in the United States,
has taken a position in favor of the payment of interest, 10 and First National
City Bank, the nation's second largest bank, has requested the Board to consider such a move.' 0 2 The suggestion was reflected in an explanatory statement by Congressman Reuss, Chairman of the House Banking, Currency and
in policy or operations. Pricing for courier services is still under study. American
Banker, Oct. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 3.
99. Brandel and Gresham, supra note 82, at 1146.
100. Testimony of Milton Friedman, Hearings on Financial Institutions in the Nation's Economy (FINE) Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing,
94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 2153-54, 2161-62 (1975-1976).
101. Letter from Willis Alexander, Executive Vice President of the American Banker's Association to Theodore Allison, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mar. 19, 1976, at 9.
102. Citicorp, supra note 83, at 7.
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Housing Committee, that related to major financial institution reform legislation. 10 3 The statement suggested that legislation would be appropriate to
require the Federal Reserve Board to institute a study into the desirability
10 4
of paying interest on reserve accounts.
There seem to be few, if any, legitimate goals that are better achieved
through government, rather than private, operation of EFT facilities. Some
financial institutions that have perceived governmentally provided services as
"free," have supported operational roles for agencies. In particular, those
banks who receive no economic return on their required reserves may have
viewed the "free" services as an equitable return on their reserves. Nevertheless, private sector operation of EFT facilities is more consistent with our
general economic and political principles. Subsidiary problems, such as an
economic return on required reserves, should be dealt with as a separate matter.
VII.

CONCLUSION

It has been a principal thesis of this article that the development of electronic funds transfer services must be recognized as one of the major components of the revolution now occurring in the provision of financial services,
and not as an isolated phenomenon. Shifts in power among the different
types of financial institutions, and the injection of nonfinancial institutions
into activities hitherto regarded as reserved to financial institutions, serve to
complicate analysis and proper regulation of the application of new technology to the provision of innovative financial services. These facts underscore
the need to approach -the federal government's role in EFT from a perspective that accounts for the multifarious forces in operation in the emergence
of EFT.
A second thesis of this article has been that electronic funds transfer activities must be regarded as nascent. As such, they require breathing and growing room. For the federal government to move too precipitously or too
heavy-handedly in imposing detailed regulations on the innovative financial
services which EFT promises, would deny to all the benefits of innovation
that a certain degree of regulatory restraint would allow. On the other hand,
certain basic principles governing the rights and responsibilities of various
parties in connection with EFT may have to be established soon. Such basic
principles include, for instance, establishment of the comparative competitive
posture of financial institutions and nonfinancial institutions in their EFT ac103. Explanation of Proposed Financial Institution Act of 1976, Daily Report for
Executives, Feb. 6, 1976, at B-1, col. 3.
104. On March 20, 1976, a bill that would require payment of interest on reserves
was introduced in the House of Representatives. H.R. 12865, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
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tivities. Furthermore, during this formative stage, the antitrust laws will
serve to prevent abuses of economic power in the development and operation
of EFT services.
Ultimately, it may prove necessary for there to be extensive and detailed
regulations covering EFT activities in order to protect the rights of consumers
and to preserve the security and integrity of the nation's financial industry.
If such regulation should prove to be necessary, the interstate and interdependent nature of EFT systems dictate that the federal government assume
a preemptive role. At present, however, federal intervention in an entrepreneurial role or through overly detailed and stringent regulations must be regarded as an unnecessary burden upon the development of beneficial financial services.
(1976). The objective of the bill was the stimulation of residential construction through
a mandatory credit allocation scheme, rather than the alleviation of the basic unfairness
referred to herein.

